Currently, the BRI, as the most ambitious overseas economic and infrastructural project China has proposed, is imperative to China and the world. Domestically, the BRI serves internal economic and political concerns of China such as creating new markets, maintaining Xinjing’s stability and unity, resolving regional development imbalance, decreasing industrial overcapacity. Internationally, the World Bank investigates the impact of BRI-related transportation infrastructure projects on GDP with acknowledged flaws in data collection and calculation, concluding that the BRI is a win-win project for the world, although not every participant will win, especially for small countries.
To make the BRI more acceptable to other nations, China endeavours to enhance the narrative of the BRI. The principles and goals of the BRI include “the harmony and inclusion” and “promotion of people-to-people bonds”. These notions are, meant to fortify China’s soft power, cultural exchange and communication within countries along the BRI route. By playing down the geopolitical and military influence of the BRI, China prefers to emphasize economic cooperation and peaceful development.
However, this picture has become far more complex, within and beyond China, than China had initially anticipated. In China, leaders and scholars in Chinese provinces intentionally promote their own interpretation of the BRI, to advance local interests, even though their narratives may contradict the central government’s. For example, some provinces talk of a “bridgehead”, alluding to a sense of growing military power. Other provinces have even gone so far as to claim that the BRI will restore China’s historical glory, recalling the ancient tribute system.
Additionally, divergent perceptions of the BRI exist among different countries. Developed countries usually refuse to subscribe to the BRI. Different understandings of the BRI appear in their central and municipal governments. In Australia, the Victorian state government has already signed two memorandums of understanding on the BRI, although the Australian Federal government has declined to participate in the BRI. Essentially, the distinct attitudes reflect two debating opponents in Australia divided by the BRI and how Australia should respond to it: economic commentators versus defence hawks or “security-intelligence-military establishment”.
By comparison, less developed countries often accept the BRI on the precondition of combining its own economic organization with the BRI. The Russian government claims the conjunction of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the BRI, where Russia expressed its support for the BRI while China agreed with Russian efforts in developing EEU economic integration. However, there are disputes between the public and government regarding the BRI. Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan follow suit with their central and municipal governments supporting the BRI. In contrast, the construction of BRI-related factories has prompted a string of anti-China protests in these countries. Additionally, Russian academics and think tanker show concerns, arguing BRI may constitute threats to the leadership of Russia in Central Asia.
This presentation will demystify the riddle of the BRI regarding its self-narrative in China and its global narrative in the world to discuss the dilemma of soft power China faces today.